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COMMENTS
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE COLLEGE
STUDENT VOTE: WHEN A RESIDENT IS NOT A
RESIDENT
I. Introduction
The standards used by state and local election officials to determine
whether students may vote as residents' of the communities in which
they attend college vary significantly among the fifty states. 2 Common
1. A "resident" is an actual intended dweller of a certain place as distinguished
from a transient dweller. See, e.g., Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 311, 114 A.2d 203,
204 (1955); People v. Carman, 38511. 23, 27, 52 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1943); Goens v.
Arinder, 248 Miss. 806, 811, 161So. 2d 509, 511 (1964) (more than mere physical
presence is required); In re Yap,- .39 Misc. 2d 835, 836, 241 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1963) (somewhere between transient person and permanent
inhabitant); 77 C.J.S. Resident 305, at 306-08 (1952). "Resident" has many meanings
in the law, largely determined by the statutory context in which it is used. Kelm v.
Carlson, 473 F.2d 1267, 1271 (6th Cir. 1973); Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158,
163 (9th Cir. 1957); Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
afJ'd, 340 U.S. 162 (1950); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284,
41 Cal. Rptr. 673, 677 (Ct. App. 1964).
Most courts and state statutes use the terms "residence" and "resident" when
defining voter eligibility. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965)
(Court reviewed election officials' decisions in "determining residence"); Mitchell v.
Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 203, 5 So. 2d 788, 793 (1942); Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla.
818, 827, 110 So. 539, 543 (1926); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 200(a) (West 1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 97.041(1)(a) (West 1982); MAss. STAT. ANN. tit. VIII, ch. 51, § 1 (1978); Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 115.133(1) (Vernon 1980); N.J. CONST. art. 2, § 3(a) (West Supp.
1982); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-104 (McKinney 1978). However, the use is inaccurate
because, while a person may have more than one residence, he may only vote in one
place. That place is his domicile. See notes 4 & 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
This Comment however, in keeping with the general practice in the voting context,
see supra, will use the term "resident" to mean one entitled to vote in the relevant
district. See notes 38-71 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the law of
domicile.
2. The constitutions or election statutes of 12 states contain a "no gain or loss"
provision that reads substantially: "For the purpose of registering and voting, no
person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or
absence ...while a student of any institution of learning." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-
104(1) (McKinney 1978). See ALA. CODE § 17-3-6 (1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-104
(1973); IDAHO CODE § 34-405 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.11(b) (West
1963); Mo. CONST. art. 8, § 6 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.487 (1960); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 654:2 (1981) ("[a student shall not] be deemed to have lost a domicile
by reason of his presence or absence"); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1978); OR. CONST.
art. II, § 4 (1981); WASH. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (1966). See also notes 93-102 infra and
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accompanying text for a discussion of the "no gain or loss" provision's effect on
students' eligibility to vote as residents at college.
Six states have similar "no gain or loss" statutes but have included "solely" before
"by reason of his presence or absence," thereby indicating that a student's presence
alone does not make him eligible to vote as a resident of the college community. See
ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.020(1) (1962); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 206 (West 1977); HAWAII
REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 11-13(5) (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 242(4)
(Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2-122(a)(7) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-2-
14(1)(b) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a) (Supp. 1981). See also notes 105-06
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this modified "no gain or loss"
provision.
The "no gain or loss" provisions of most of the 18 states employing them have been
interpreted as not barring students from establishing a voting residence at college.
See Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972) (student may establish
domicile at college despite intention to leave area upon graduation); Shivelhood v.
Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Vt. 1971) (students are to be treated the same as non-
students); Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr 697 (1971)
(twenty-sixth amendment requires that 18- to 21-year-old citizens be treated the
same as older citizens); Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 165 (1884) (must intend to
make college permanent home independent of sojourn as a student); Wilkins v.
Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971) (students are to be treated the same
as non-students); Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 48, 286
N.E.2d 247, 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 868 (1972) (facts supporting student claim of
domicile change must be "wholly independent of his presence at the college for
educational purposes... "); 387 Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. (1971) (requires abandonment
of original residence, no intention of returning to it and declaration of intent to
establish residence in college community indefinitely); accord Zimmerman v. Zim-
merman, 175 Or. 585, 155 P.2d 293 (1945) (state's "no gain or loss" statute applying
to soldiers and students interpreted as creating a rebuttable presumption as it applies
to soldiers); 168 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. (1920); 71-119 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. (1971); 10
01). Wash. Att'y Gen. (1971).
Two other states' statutes appear to be restrictive towards students. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-1-21-3(1) (Burns 1982) (discussed at note 111 infra); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
art. 5.08(k) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (discussed at note 112 infra). The Texas statute was
struck down as violative of students' equal protection rights. Whatley v. Clark, 482
F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Whatley, 415 U.S. 934
(1974) ("compelling state interest" test applied). See notes 18-20 infra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the compelling state interest test; see notes 112-16 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Texas statute and Whatley.
Four states have domicile statutes that are expressly neutral towards students. See
CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 206 (West 1977) ("no gain or loss" provision shall not
prevent student from establishing domicile at college if he has abandoned former
place of residence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-104 (1973) ("[njo person otherwise
qualified . . . shall be denied the right to register or to vote.., solely because he is a
student... "); WIs. STAT. § 6.10(2) (1975) ("[s]tudent status shall not be a consider-
ation in determining residence for the purpose of establishing voter eligibility").
Lousiana's statute is quite unrestrictive: "Any bona-fide full-time student attending
[college] in this state may choose as his residence and may register to vote either at
the place where he resides while attending [college] or at the place where he resides
when not attending such [college] . . . .Such a student need not have an intent to
reside indefinitely at the place where he offers to register." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:101(C) (West 1979).
[Vol. XI
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law domicile principles 3, which determine residency for voting pur-
poses, 4 often have been distorted when applied to students so that a
state or its subdivision can effectuate its policy of encouraging or
discouraging student voting at college. 5
Two fundamental rights conflict in determining whether college
students should be entitled to vote as residents of their college com-
The remaining states have no statute specifically relating to college students, but
case law and attorney general opinions have established the law pertaining to voting
at college in most of these states. See, e.g., McCoy v. McLeroy, 348 F. Supp. 1034,
1037 n.7, 1039 (M.D. Ga. 1972) (no equal protection violation in denying the right to
vote as Georgia residents to college students who paid out-of-state tuition and pos-
sessed out-of-state driver's licenses); Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D.
Pa. 1972) (students living at college who intend it, and no other place, as their legal
residence should be allowed to vote there); Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D.
Ky. 1971) (students are to be treated the same as non-students); Anderson v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (same); Anderson v. Pifer, 315 I11. 164, 146 N.E.
171 (1925) (only those students free of parental control who regard college town as
home and have no other home to return to in case of sickness may vote at college);
Paulson v. Forest City Community School Dist., 238 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Iowa 1976)
(student may establish domicile and vote at college; where his home may arguably be
in either of two places, it is where he declares it to be); Schaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md.
66, 20 A. 434 (1890) (rebuttable presumption against student domicile at college);
Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars, 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d 656 (1974) (students are
to be treated the same as non-students); Swan v. Bowker, 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W.
891 (1938) (self-supporting students who regard college location as home may vote
there); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 348, 294 A.2d 233,
245 (1972) (even students who plan to return to their previous residences can estab-
lish a voting residence at college); Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843
(1979) (rebuttable presumption against student domicile at college); 72-1 Op. Ariz.
Att'y Gen. 1 (1972) (unemancipated minor attending college in state whose parents
are nonresidents of state may register to vote in Arizona); 071-202A Op. Fla. Att'y
Gen. 287 (1971) (student status should place upon an applicant no greater burden
than upon others); 71-328 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 350 (1971) (students are to be treated
the same as non-students).
3. See notes 38-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of applicable
common law domicile principles.
4. See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fields, 81 F. Supp. 54, 54 (S.D. Cal.
1948); Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 203, 5 So. 2d 788, 793 (1942); Herron v.
Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 827, 110 So. 539, 543 (1946); Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md.
556, 559, 40 A. 379, 380 (1898); see also 25 AM. JuR. 2D Elections §§ 66-78 (1966); 29
C.J.S. Elections § 19 (1965).
5. See note 73 infra; see also Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d
36, 47-48, 286 N.E.2d 247, 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 867-68 (1972) (a non-student's
physical presence and claimed change of permanent residence would normally be
sufficient to establish domicile but'the same presence and claim by a student, without
more, "is deemed evidence merely of an intention to reside temporarily . . . for
purposes consistent with preparation for a certain calling"); Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C.
416, 442-43, 251 S.E.2d 843, 860 (1979) (rebuttable presumption that student who
leaves parents' home to go to college is not domiciled at college does not violate equal
protection).
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munities: the right of students to the equal protection of the laws6 and
the right of states to limit the right to vote to bona fide residents.7
This Comment will demonstrate the need for the education of
election officials and college students8 in the common law principles
of domicile." Moreover, it will conclude that uniform voting residency
standards 10 and more efficient and comprehensive absentee-ballot
voting systems" are essential to the effective enfranchisement of stu-
6. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See notes 14-36 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection.
7. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 91, 93-94 (1965); Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973); Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); McCoy v.
McLeroy, 348 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp.
527, 533 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Reiff, Ohio Residency Law For Student Voters-Its
Implications and A Proposal For More Effective Implementation of Residency Stat-
utes, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 465-68 (1979); Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31
OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 707 (1970); Note, State Residency Requirements For Purposes of
Voting: The Eligibility of Students to Vote in Their College Communities, 21 AM.
U.L. REV. 774, 774 (1972) (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972)). A
bona fide resident is a domiciliary. See notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 121-29 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of how con-
flicting state voting residency standards might result in disenfranchisement of college
students.
9. See notes 133-53 & 172 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
present absentee ballot voting laws and the recommended solution.
10. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age." U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, § 1.
Although the twenty-sixth amendment speaks only of age discrimination, its his-
tory shows a particular concern among legislators for college students, who com-
prised approximately 50% of those between 18 and 21 years of age at the time of its
passage. See 117 CONG. REC. 5817, 5825 (1971) (remarks of Sens. Percy & Brooke);
see also Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1973) (citing this legislative
history).
The relatively high degree of education among 18- to 21-year-olds, and their
frustration at not being allowed to voice their opinions through the ballot, were
persuasive factors in the passage of the twenty-sixth amendment. See Lowering the
Voting Age to 18: Hearings on S.26 Before the Subcomn. on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No.
26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see also notes 29 & 49 infra.
11. College students considering changing their voting residences to their college
communities should be made aware of the requirements for and consequences of such
a move so that they can make an informed decision.
Election registrars' lack of familiarity with domicile law might cause them to deny
the right to vote at college to qualified students and permit unqualified non-students
the right to vote. See notes 36, 55, 56 & 87 infra and accompanying text for
discussions of how unequal domicile standards have been applied to students and
non-students. Whether this unequal treatment has been intentional or due to regis-
trars' ignorance of domicile law, the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
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dents, a major congressional consideration in the passage of the
twenty-sixth amendment.12
II. The Applicable Equal Protection Standard
Although the equal protection clause 13 does not require identical
treatment of all persons in all respects, 14 it does require that a state
provide adequate justification for treating one group of persons differ-
ently than another.15 However, since the right to vote is a fundamen-
tal right' which the Supreme Court is "zealous to protect,"17 a state
must show a "compelling" and not merely "rational" justification for a
voting restriction.' 8 Moreover, the means used to attain the state's goal
requires that the same standards be applied to students and non-students. See note 89
infra. See note 6 supra for text of the equal protection clause.
Registrars' lack of familiarity with domicile law might also cause them to allow
unqualified students to register and vote at college. Such a result has occurred in
Ohio. See Reiff, supra note 7, at 451, 455 n.24.
12. See notes 38-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of domicile law,
requirements for changing domicile and consequences of such a change.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. See, e.g., Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583-84
(1935) (state statutory discrimination between foreign and domestic insurance corpo-
rations favorable to the latter does not violate equal protection); accord Stebbins v.
Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 143 (1925) (tax regulation); Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584, 586
(1900) (railroad regulation).
15. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 270 (1970) (Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part, concurring in part); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 68,
71-72 (1968) (denying right of recovery to illegitimate child for wrongful death of
mother violates equal protection).
16. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 385 U.S. 663, 670 (1966);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1964) ("[n]o right is more precious in a free country than [the right to vote]"); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("preservative of all rights"); see also 1
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. PB 252-234, AN ANALYSIS
OF LAWS AND PROCEDUaES GOVERNING ABSENTEE REGISTRATION AND ABSENTEE VOTING
IN THE U.S. 31 (1975) (prepared for the Office of Fed. Elections in cooperation with
the U.S. Fed. Election Comm'n) (voting is the "most fundamental of the democratic
rights upon which the nation is founded," but public administration of elections is a
service that is poorly conducted) [hereinafter cited as ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS];
accord Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (quoting Wesberry).
17. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
18. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1970) (state
had no compelling interest in restricting right to vote for or against approval of
general obligation bonds to real property taxpayers); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419, 422, 426 (1970) (state had no compelling interest in preventing residents of
federal enclave located within state borders from voting in state elections); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (state had no compelling
interest in restricting right to vote in school district elections to real property taxpay-
ers and parents of school children); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704,
706 (1969) (state had no compelling interest in restricting right to vote for or against
approval of municipal revenue bonds to real property taxpayers); Kelm v. Carlson,
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must be the most narrow available. 19 This compelling state interest
test is applied in student voting cases. 20
States argue that voter residency requirements (1) facilitate voter
identification to prevent fraud,2 (2) promote a more informed elec-
torate 22 and (3) assure voter membership and interest in the commu-
nity. 23 Most courts have found that these justifications are insufficient
to support a presumption against student residency. 24
473 F.2d 1267, 1271 (6th Cir. 1973) (state regulation requiring that out-of-state
residents pay higher college tuition than in-state residents does riot invoke "compel-
ling state interest" test, but regulation concerned with a fundamental right, "like
voting," would invoke such a standard); accord Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71
(1968) (Court has been "extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights").
19. See, e.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632 (state law did not meet the "exacting
standard of precision [required] of statutes which selectively distribute the fran-
chise"); accord Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. at 208-09 (Court applied Kramer principles);
Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 704 (same).
20. Relying on the Supreme Court's concern with preventing burdens on the
right to vote, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968), the Michigan
Supreme Court found that the distinction between an absolute denial of voting rights
and a burden on them imposed by a rebuttable presumption of nonresidency was
irrelevant to whether the compelling state interest test should be applied. Wilkins v.
Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 685, 189 N.W.2d 423, 429 (1971). Accord Bright v. Baesler,
336 F. Supp. 527, 533 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (voting rights involve the first amendment
freedom of association; therefore, the extra burden imposed on students to prove
domicile is constitutional only if a compelling state interest is thereby served); Wor-
den v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 346, 294 A.2d 233, 244 (1972)
(compelling state interest test applied because "it is so patently sound and so just in its
consequences"); see also Comment, Wilkins v. Bentley: Getting Out the Student Vote
in Michigan, 70 MICH. L. REV. 920, 937-42 (1972). But see Palla v. Suffolk County
Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 49, 286 N.E.2d 247, 253, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 869
(1972) ("not every limitation or incidental burden upon the right to vote compels
such close constitutional scrutiny").
21. The prevention of fraudulent voting is a legitimate state concern. See cases
cited in note 23 infra. But see notes 25-28 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of why this concern does not justify preventing students from voting as
college area domiciliaries.
22. States have a legitimate interest in promoting a more informed electorate by
ensuring that voters have at least had the opportunity to obtain knowledge of the
candidates and issues. See cases cited in note 23 infra. But see note 29 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of why this concern does not justify preventing
students from voting as college area domiciliaries.
23. See, e.g., Dreuding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md. 1964), afJ'd
mem., 380 U.S. 125 (1965); Worden, 61 N.J. at 346-47, 294 A.2d at 244; Estopinal v.
Michel, 121 La. 879, 881, 46 So. 907, 908 (1908); Shenton v. Abbot, 178 Md. 526,
531, 15 A.2d 906, 908 (1940). See also Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 685-90, 189
N.W.2d 423, 430-32 (1971) (discussion of justifications number two and number
three together in terms of promotion of a concerned and interested electorate);
Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 93, 94-95 (1969) (indicates that communications and registra-
tion improvements undermine state justifications).
24. See notes 25-34 infra and accompanying text. But see Lloyd v. Babb, 296
N.C. 416, 442-43, 251 S.E.2d 843, 860 (1979) (no denial of equal protection in use of
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A state's interest in the prevention of fraudulent voting does not
justify excluding students from voting in their college communities 25
because of existing adequate procedural safeguards 2 and criminal
penalties for fraud. 27 Additionally, there is no reasonable basis for
believing that students are more likely to engage in fraud than others28
or are less informed than non-students regarding the candidates and
issues.29
rebuttable presumption that student who leaves parents' home to attend college is not
domiciled at college).
25. See e.g., Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973)("a presump-
tion that students are not residents of their college communities is [not] necessary to
promote [the state's interest in preventing fraudulent voting]"); Worden, 61 N.J. at
346-47, 336-37, 294 A.2d at 244, 237 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 354
(state registration and criminal laws furnish adequate protection against fraudulent
voting)); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 686-87, 189 N.W.2d at 430; cJ. Sloane v. Smith, 351
F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D.Pa. 1972) (non-students with less proof of domicile than
some students were permitted to register; this allows inference that preventing fraud
was not a major state concern in prohibiting stu dent registration).
26. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.505 (West 1963) (registration
officers shall ascertain whether registrant is already registered in another district); id.
§ 168.523 (before voting, one must sign his name and address, which are compared
with the registration card "and if the same do not correspond the vote of such person
shall be challenged"); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-304 (McKinney 1978) (signature of voter
must correspond with that on registration form).
27. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 296.40 (West 1977) (crime punishable by 1-3
years in jail); id. § 296.42 (fraud by absentee is a felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.041
(West 1982) (a felony); Ky. REV. STAT. § 127.150(2) (1971) (a misdemeanor); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:34-11 (West 1964) (a misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-268
(1980) (a misdemeanor).
28. See Worden, 61 N.J. at 346-47, 294 A.2d at 244 ("there has been no sugges-
tion . . . that there is any real danger of dual or improper voting, once the right of
students who choose to register and vote from their college residences and not
elsewhere is recognized"); Note, supra note 7, at 786 (there is no evidence that
students have ever, or will ever, seek to vote in two places).
29. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 245-46 (1970) (Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (18-year-olds are as "interested,
able, and responsible in voting" as are older citizens); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 690, 189
N.W.2d at 432 ("[t]here is every reason to believe they might be even better informed
on current issues than other citizens"); Worden, 61 N.J. at 347, 294 A.2d at 244
(students have actively participated in political campaigns and have shown special
political awareness and interest in state and local as well as federal matters).
The legislative history of the twenty-sixth amendment indicates that college stu-
dents are at least as well informed as the rest of the electorate. At hearings before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst conveyed President Nixon's views about
the wisdom of lowering the voting age:
America's 10 million young people between the ages of 18 and 21 are
better equipped than ever . . . to be entrusted with all of the responsibili-
ties and privileges of citizenship. Their well-informed intelligence, enthu-
siastic interest, and desire to participate in public affairs at all levels
exemplifies the highest qualities of mature citizenship.
1983]
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Most courts have ruled that a presumption that college students are
not interested members of the community has no factual basis.
30
Moreover, the exclusionary classification"' is not "sufficiently drawn
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1970). Accord remarks of Senator Goldwater, id.; remarks
of Dr. Margaret Mead, id., remarks of former Presidential Assistant Sorenson, (citing
the conclusion of the Fact-Finding Commission on Columbia Disturbances (Cox
Commission) (young adults possess a "higher level of social consciousness than pre-
ceding generations")). Id. at 129.
This legislative history was included in the Senate Report accompanying Senate
Joint Resolution 7 (later enacted as the twenty-sixth amendment). S. REP. No. 26,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1971). The report stated, in part:
Today more than half of the 18- to 21-year-olds are receiving some type of
higher education. Today nearly 80 percent of these young people are high
school graduates. [In 1920] less than 10 percent went on to college and less
than 20 percent . . . actually graduated from high school.
...[S]tudent unrest of recent years ...reflects the interest and concern
of today's youth over the important issues of our day.
[W]e must channel these energies into our political system and give young
people the real opportunity to influence our society in a peaceful and
constructive manner.
Id. at 6. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 243-45 (nearly uniform practice of
treating 18-year-olds as adults for other legal purposes further undermines the ratio-
nale for denying them the voting franchise); 117 CONG. REC. 5817 (1971) (remarks of
Sen. Percy); 116 CONG. REC. 6433-34 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Cook); id. at 6929-30
(remarks of Sens. Talmadge & Ervin).
30. See, e.g., Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1304-05 (state failed to show a compelling
interest in requiring that students meet a more stringent test of domicile than non-
students; such a scheme was not even reasonable); Bright, 336 F. Supp. at 533 (there
is no reason to believe that students can not (1) establish a domicile within the
university community, (2) take a serious interest in the political issues of that area
and (3) responsibly exercise their franchise); Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111,
1116 (D.Vt. 1976) (due to increased mobility, fewer students than in the past are
likely to return to settle in their pre-college communities and, while attending
college, they are more likely to be aware of and concerned about the issues in their
college towns than those in their former communities); Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d
565, 574, 488 P.2d 1, 6, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702 (1971) (emphasizes the value of
younger citizens' interest in state and local policy) (citing S. REP. No. 26, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 372 (legislative history of
the twenty-sixth amendment)); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 688-90, 189 N.W.2d at 431
(factors showing students' ties with the college community include: (1) subjection to
state and local regulations, id. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at 431; (2) consideration as
residents of the college area by the Census Bureau, id.; see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, USUAL RESIDENCE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (1966); and (3)
payment of state income, sales, gasoline and property taxes (through increased
rents)); Worden, 61 N.J. at 347, 294 A.2d at 244-45 (same); see notes 75-79 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of these indicia of domicile. See notes 55-56 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection standards as applied to
student questionnaires and presumptions.
31. The exclusionary classification presumes that students are not college-area
residents for voting purposes.
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to insure that only voters who are primarily interested are allowed to
vote." 32 Several courts suggest that this alleged justification is a thinly-
disguised exclusion of citizens for fear of the way they may vote, 33 a
practice uniformly held to be violative of equal protection laws. 34
Election officials possess much discretion in applying common law
domicile principles to determine which applicants are eligible to vote
in a particular district. 35 Inconsistent application of these principles to
32. Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 687, 189 N.W.2d at 430. "Clearly ... [the state's
general voter registration statute] will allow many disinterested persons, by any
criteria, to vote, while [the "no gain or loss' statute] as applied to students, disenfran-
chises many interested and concerned citizens." Id. " '[T]he classifications must be
tailored so that the exclusion ... is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.'
Id. at 687, 189 N.W.2d at 430 (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632).
33. See, e.g., Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1304-05 ("policy followed by [election
officials] in determining the residence of new voters was adopted as a result of their
apprehension over the student vote..."); Jolicoeur, 5 Cal. 3d at 571-72, 488 P.2d at
4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 700 ("[f]ears of the way minors living away from their parents
may vote or of their impermanency in the community may not be used to justify
special presumptions-conclusive or otherwise-that they are not bona fide residents
of the community in which they live"); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 691-92, 189 N.W.2d at
432-33 (court notes that fear of how students might vote influenced its decision in
1893 not to allow them to vote at college, but that the development of the equal
protection clause since then makes such a motive unconstitutional).
34. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 354-55; Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. 419, 423 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965); cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32
(1968) ("[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral process").
35. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-104(2) (McKinney 1978):
[I]n determining a voter's qualification to register and vote, the board...
shall consider ...the applicant's expressed intent, his conduct and all
attendant surrounding circumstances relating thereto, [including his] fi-
nancial independence, business pursuits, employment, income sources,
...marital status, residence of parents. . . and other such factors that it
may reasonably deem necessary. . . .The decision of a board to which
such application is made shall be presumptive evidence of a person's
residence for voting purposes.
New York election officials have summarily denied students the right to register
because they resided at college. Palla, 31 N.Y.2d at 43-44, 286 N.E.2d at 250-51, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 864.
Vague statutory and administrative standards can give rise to violations of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause ("[no State shall] deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1). See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (due process "requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines . . . to prevent 'arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement' "); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69
(1972) (due process is violated by local ordinance that gives police "unfettered
discretion" in its enforcement); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951) (city
ordinance prescribing no appropriate standard for administrative action and giving
administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens
to speak on religious matters in public places violates the first amendment and due
1983]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
students and non-students by election officials raises equal protection
problems. 3 Proper resolution of this issue requires reconciliation of
one's right not to be discriminated against because of his student status
with the state right to require that only bona fide residents vote. Since
domicile principles determine residency for voting purposes, 37 correct
application of these principles is essential to resolving this issue.
III. Application of the Common Law of Domicile
"Domicile" is the one location with which for legal purposes a
person is considered to have the most settled and permanent con-
nection, the place where he intends to remain and to which, when-
ever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, but which the
law may also assign to him constructively; whereas "residence"
connotes any factual place of abode of some permanency, more
than a mere temporary sojourn. 38
process under the fourteenth amendment); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 691
(N.D. Ill. 1978) ("[a] law is unconstitutionally vague when it ... gives law enforce-
ment personnel the opportunity to enforce it according to their personal prejudices")
(citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)); cf. International Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 1978) (city ordinance restrict-
ing distribution of literature to those "authorized by law" to do so was "void ... for
vagueness" because it gave enforcement officials no guidelines).
Some courts have considered whether special voting statutes or practices applied to
students are so vague that they violate the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
as well as the equal protection clause. Compare Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 677-78, 189
N.W.2d at 426 (" 'guidelines are so vague as to be tantamount to no standards; thus
each registration clerk determines himself which factors will overcome the presump-
tion against student registrability in his city' ") with Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 442, 251
S.E.2d at 860 (no due process violation in asking special questions of students) [and]
Palla, 31 N.Y.2d at 46, 286 N.E.2d at 251, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (state's "no gain or
loss" provision does not violate students' due process rights). See generally Bullard &
Rice, Restrictions on Student Voting: An Unconstitutional Anachronism, 4 J.L.
REFORM 215, 221 (1970).
36. See, e.g., Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D.Pa. 1972) (two
non-students were allowed to register after listing their occupations and without
furnishing proof of domicile; court concluded that "in actual practice non-students
were not subjected to the same scrutiny and proof as were students"); Bright, 336 F.
Supp. at 532 & n.4 (non-students were routinely registered; students were routinely
not registered); Worden, 61 N.J. at 329, 294 A.2d at 235 (election officials admitted
disparate treatment of students); accord Whatley, 482 F.2d at 1233.
37. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
38. Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 239-40, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (1955); see also
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-25 (1914); Codagnone v. Perrin, 351 F.
Supp. 1126 (D.R.I. 1972); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 38 F. Supp.
629, 631 (W.D. La. 1941); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278,
284, 41 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1964); Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co., 384 I11. 148, 156, 51 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1943); Estopinal v. Michel, 121 La. 879,
881, 46 So. 907, 908 (1908); Shenton v. Abbot, 178 Md. 526, 530, 15 A.2d 906, 908
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While a person may have more than one residence, he may not, at
one time, have more than one domicile.39 Courts apply the legal
principle of domicile of choice 40 in determining one's domicile for
voting purposes. 41 Three elements are required to establish a domicile
of choice: (1) legal capacity, (2) physical presence at a place and (3)
the intention of making such place one's home for the time at least. 42
The burden of proof is on the party alleging a change of domicile. 43
(1940); State v. Benny, 20 N.J. 238, 251, 119 A.2d 155, 162 (1955) (intention to make
a place one's home, "adequately manifested is the catalyst which converts a residence
from a mere place in which a person lives to a domicile"); In re Paich's Estate, 90
Ohio L. Abs. 470, 473, 186 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ct. App. 1962); accord Van Matre v.
Sankey, 148 111. 536, 547, 36 N.E. 628, 633 (1893) (domicile and residence are not
synonymous); In re Yap, 39 Misc. 2d at 837, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 979 ("a person may be a
domiciliary of one place and a resident of another, and even a resident of more than
one place"); J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43, at 37 (1872) ("there is no universally
agreed . . . enumeration of the ingredients which constitute domicile").
39. See, e.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914); United States ex.
rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F.2d 485, 486 (2d Cir. 1928); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Fields, 81 F. Supp. 54, 57 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Shenton, 178 Md. at 530, 15 A.2d at 908;
Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 207-08, 192 N.E. 294, 295 (1934); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971) ("at least for the same purpose, no
person has more than one domicile at a time"); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 3 (1941).
40. Domicile of choice is that which is voluntarily acquired. This is distinct from
domicile of origin (acquired at birth) and domicile by operation of law (construc-
tively applied). See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 1008, 133 So. 374, 375
(1927); Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 415, 99 S.E. 240, 242 (1919);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15 (1934); J. STORY, supra note 38, § 49, at 44;
25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicile §§ 12-15 (1966); 28 C.J.S. Domicile §§ 4-7 (1941).
41. See cases and other authorities cited in note 4 supra.
42. See, e.g., Yale v. West Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295,
296 (1890); Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 449, 251 S.E.2d at 861, Zimmerman v. Zimmerman,
175 Or. 585, 592, 155 P.2d 293, 296 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 15 (1971); 1 J.. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 132-33 (1935); H. GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 40-41 (E. Scoles 4th ed. 1964); J. STORY supra note 38, §§ 44, 46
at 37, 41. Acquisition of domicile of choice presumes legal capacity. Matthews v.
Matthews, 141 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. App. 1962); Zimmerman, 175 Or. at 592, 155
P.2d at 296; 25 AM. JUR. 2 D Domicile § 14 (1966). Most cases do not discuss legal
capacity. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939); Mitchell v. United
States, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 350, 353 (1874); Jennings v. Fanti, 96 F. Supp. 264, 266
(M.D. Pa. 1951); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. at 57; In re Dorrance's
Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 277, 170 A. 601, 604 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 116
N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); In re Dorrance's
Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 168, 163 A. 303, 307 (1932). See also Gallagher v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 185 F.2d 543, 545, 546-47 (3d Cir. 1950) (intention to remain for an
indefinite period is sufficient); Marathon County v. Milwaukee County, 273 Wis.
541, 548, 79 N.W.2d 233, 238 (1956) (intent to remain for the rest of one's life or for
any particular length of time not required).
43. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. at 427; Desmare v. United States, 93
U.S. 605, 610 (1876); Mitchell, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 353; Agassiz v. Trefry, 260 F.
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A. Legal Capacity
Under common law rules of domicile, an unemancipated 44 minor
cannot acquire a domicile of choice. 45 The mere fact that a minor has
moved away from his parents' home does not necessarily result in
emancipation. 46 However, emancipation may be implied from the
circumstances and requires neither attainment of majority nor issu-
ance of a court decree. 47 Some courts have found that students still
substantially supported by parents and subject to parental control
may not vote in their college communities because no change of
domicile has occurred. 48 This common law rule should not be used in
226, 230 (D.C. Mass. 1919), afJ'd, 266 F. 8 (1st Cir. 1920); Sealy v. United States, 7
F. Supp. 434, 437 (E.D. Va. 1934); Caheen v. Caheen, 233 Ala. 494, 497, 172 So.
618, 620 (1937); In re Lydig's Estate, 191 A.D. 117, 120, 180 N.Y.S. 843, 846 (1st
Dep't 1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 comment c (1971);
28 C.J.S. Domicile § 16 (1941).
44. An unemancipated minor is still subject to parental control and authority
and legally entitled to parental support. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280,
283-84, 63 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1948); Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119
Conn. 380, 384-85, 177 A. 138, 140 (1935); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Differding, 46 111. App. 3d 15, 20, 360 N.E.2d 522, 525-26 (App. Ct. 1977); Vogel v.
Williams, 118 Ind. App. 451, 457, 79 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Ct. App. 1948); Wallace v.
Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 73, 188 S.W. 611, 612 (1916).
45. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933) (in divorce
proceeding, domicile of unemancipated minor is that of father seeking divorce);
Bjornquist v. Bostu.. & A.R. Co., 250 F. 929, 931 (1st Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 248
U.S. 573; In re Re Henning's Estate, 128 Cal. 214, 219, 60 P. 762, 764 (1900); Yale,
59 Conn. at 491, 22 A. at 296 (because a minor can not exercise an independent
intent in a matter such as domicile); Van Matre, 148 Ill. at 547, 36 N.E. at 633;
Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 221, 285 P. 606, 614 (1930); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22 comment a (1971); 25 AM. JuR. 2D Domicile § 63 (1966).
46. See, e.g., Vaupel v. Bellach, 154 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Iowa 1967); Porter v.
Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 157-59, 44 N.W. 295, 297-98 (1890); Wallace, 136 Tenn. at 76,
188 S.W. at 613; 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 95 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Zozaski v. Mather Stock Car Co., 312 Ill. App. 585, 588-89, 38
N.E.2d 825, 826 (1942) (emancipation may be implied from the circumstances);
Surface v. Dorrell, 115 1nd. App. 244, 250, 57 N.E.2d 66, 68 (1944); Porter, 79 Iowa
at 154-55, 44 N.W. at 296; Merithew v. Ellis, 116 Me. 468, 471-72, 102 A. 301, 302
(1917); Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238, 240, 154 N.W. 1097, 1098 (1915) (how-
ever, a minor may be emancipated for some purposes and not for others); Wallace,
136 Tenn. at 73, 188 S.W. at 612; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 22 comment f (1971) (it is usually sufficient that the minor "[attain] years of
discretion, [and] maintain ... a separate way of life, . . . with his parents' consent,"
if they are living and have not abandoned him); 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child §
95 (1971) ("[o]nce the family relationship is altered so that the child is no longer
subject to parental care and discipline, the child is . . .emancipated").
48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (1925) (only
those students "entirely free from parental control, who regard the college town as
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determining where a particular minor resides for voting purposes
because the twenty-sixth amendment emancipates minors over 18 "for
all purposes related to voting.
49
their home and who have no other home to return to in case of sickness" may vote at
college); Reiner v. Board of Elections, 54 Misc. 2d 1030, 283 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County), afJ'd, 28 A.D.2d 1095 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 865, 231
N.E.2d 785, 285 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1967) (court allowed college domicile to students who
were married and showed that they were "on their own," implying that students still
subject to parental control and support could not establish domicile at college).
49. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 575, 488 P.2d 1, 7, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 703
(1971) (American youth's deep concern about their country and their defense of it in
Vietnam are strong arguments for allowing them to vote; refusing to treat them as
adults for voting purposes "violates the letter and spirit of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment"); accord 71-119 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. (1971); 5-24-72 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 256
(1972).
Two other courts did not need to consider this statutory age-of-emancipation
conflict because their states' laws make 18-year-olds adults. See Paulson v. Forest
City Community School Dist., 238 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Iowa 1976); Worden v. Mercer
County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 345-46, 294 A.2d 233, 243-44 (1972). Other
courts seemed to assume the point made in Jolicoeur, that 18-year-olds are adults for
voting purposes. See, e.g., Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 531 (E.D. Ky. 1971)
("[t]here is no law or statute in Kentucky, as far as this court has been able to
ascertain, which states that a minor cannot, for voting purposes, establish a domicile
other than that of his parents"); Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d
36, 48, 286 N.E.2d 247, 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 868 (1972). See generally Note,
Student Voting and Apportionment: The "Rotten Boroughs" of Academia, 81 YALE
L.J. 35, 53-59 (1971) (discussion of twenty-sixth amendment's presumption that 18-
year-olds are adults).
The congressional history of the twenty-sixth amendment strongly supports this
position. The Senate Report accompanying Senate Joint Resolution, later to become
the twenty-sixth amendment, stated:
[T]hese younger citizens are fully mature enough to vote. There is no
magic to the age of 21. The 21 year age of maturity is derived only from
historical accident. In the eleventh century 21 was the age at which most
males were physically capable of carrying armor. But the physical ability
to carry armor in the eleventh century clearly has no relation to the
intellectual and emotional qualifications to vote in twentieth century
America. And even if physical maturity were the crucial determinant of
the right to vote, 18-year-olds would deserve that right: Dr. Margaret
Mead and others have shown that the age of physical maturity of Ameri-
can youth has dropped more than three years since the eighteenth cen-
tury . ..
[O]ur younger citizens today are mentally and emotionally capable of
full participation in our democratic form of government. . ..
[O]ur 18-year-old citizens have earned the right to vote because they
bear all or most of an adult citizen's responsibilities.
S. REP. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1971). See also note 29 supra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of college students' interest in and knowledge of political
affairs.
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B. Physical Presence and Durational Residency Requirements
Many state statutes have required varying periods of physical pres-
ence within the intended domicile before one is eligible to vote there. 50
In 1971, the Supreme Court struck down Tennessee's one-year dura-
tional residency requirement as unconstitutional. 51 Since then, dura-
tional residency requirements have been held invalid except to the
extent that they are required for reasonable administrative purposes
with respect to registration. 52 Therefore, durational residency require-
ments are merely administrative devices to help identify bona fide
residents.5 3
C. The "Intention" Criterion
The intention requirement clearly has caused the most controversy
as applied to college students. 54 This controversy centers around the
more extensive questioning of students than of non-students5 5 and the
use of rebuttable presumptions of intention. 5
50. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2811(2), (3) (Purdon 1963) (one year in
state, 60 days in district); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-5 (West 1964) (6 months in state,
40 days in county). Subsequent to Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), dura-
tional residency requirements were decreased to 30 days. See, e.g., 1972 Op. Pa.
Att'y Gen. 63 (durational residency requirements in excess of 30 days are unenforce-
able); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-5 (West Supp. 1982) (30 days in state and county).
See also note 52 infra and accompanying text.
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Meyers v. Jackson, 390 F. Supp. 37, 44 (E.D. Ark. 1975); State v.
Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453, 455 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1972) (30 days is the maximum
permissible residency period that can be required for voting); Chapman v. Foote,
112 N.H. 298, 293 A.2d 772 (1972); 1972 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 63 (instructing Pennsyl-
vania's chief election officer to disregard the Commonwealth's constitutional and
statutory durational residency requirements greater than 30 days). See also ABSENTEE
REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 119. ("[i]mproved communications, improv-
ing educational levels, and improved methods of identifying citizens through the
issuance of official documents of identity (e.g., birth certificates, driving licenses,
social security cards) have largely removed the original rationale for durational
residency requirements").
53. See Reiff, supra note 7, at 461 n.59.
54. See note 28 supra and notes 92, 93-116 & 120 infra and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Kinley, 499 F. Supp.. 1329, 1341 (N.D.N.Y. 1980);
Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Worden, 61 N.J. at
3,18, 294 A.2d at 245 (students "are no more transient than many other groups whose
right to vote in communities where they are short-term residents is never ques-
tioned"). But see McCoy v. McLeroy, 348 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 n.7 (M.D. Ga. 1972)
(because Georgia law requires that all motor vehicles owned by residents be licensed
by Georgia, "a person who regularly drives an out of state licensed motor vehicle in
Georgia has already determined and is evidencing his determination that he is not a
resident of Georgia").
56. See, e.g., Auerbach, 499 F. Supp. at 1341, 1343 (presumption of student
nonresidency and use of a questionnaire solely for students violates their equal
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protection rights); accord United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. 1245, 1257, 1261
(S.D. Tex. 1978), afJ'd mem., 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (use of questionnaire solely for
students and refusal to register them unless they established that they intended to
remain in the community after graduation violates the fourteenth and twenty-sixth
amendments). But see Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 442-43, 251 S.E.2d at 860-61 (rebuttable
presumption that student who leaves parents' home to go to college is not domiciled
at the college location does not violate equal protection because it "is merely a
specialized statement of the general rule that the burden of proof is on one alleging a
change in domicile"). A special inquiry of students is "not an attempt to 'fence out' a
segment of the community because of the way they may vote. It is instead a
permissible attempt to determine who are the members of the relevant community."
Id. at 441-42, 251 S.E.2d at 860. But a student who intends to remain only until
graduation should not on that basis alone be denied the right to vote in that commu-
nity. Id. at 443, 251 S.E.2d at 861; accord Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780,
786 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (constitutionally permissible to "enumerate certain categories of
persons who, despite their physical presence, may lack the intention required for
voting," as long as they "are given at least an opportunity to show the election
officials that they are bona fide residents") (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
95 (1965)).
The Supreme Court in Carrington held unconstitutional a Texas statute that
prohibited members of the armed forces who had moved to Texas during their
military service from acquiring a voting residence. 380 U.S. at 96. The Court held
only that Texas' absolute denial of the right to vote to servicemen violated their equal
protection rights. Id. The Court noted that the conclusive presumption of nonresi-
dency applied only to servicemen. Id. at 95. Other groups, including students,
presenting "specialized problems in determining residence" were provided "at least
an opportunity" to prove residency. Id. (dictum). The Court then stated that "Texas
is free to take reasonable and adequate steps. . . to see that all applicants for the vote
actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence." Id. at 96.
Shortly before Ramey was decided, a Texas statute providing a rebuttable pre-
sumption against student residency was found constitutional. Wilson v. Symm, 341
F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (relying on Carrington dictum). However, subsequent to
the Ramey decision, this statute was struck down on equal protection grounds.
Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. White v.
Whatley, 415 U.S. 934 (1974). The Whatley court concluded that (1) Carrington did
not foreclose a challenge to the Texas statute and (2) the Supreme Court's reference in
Carrington to the opportunity given to students and other groups to prove domicile
"'should be seen only in contrast to the total disenfranchisement of servicemen, not as
tacit approval of a rebuttable presumption of nonresidency as applied to students."
Id. at 1234.
"Since the equal protection analysis in Ramey was premised at least in part on the
authority of Wilson, which subsequently was overruled by Whatley, Ramey's prece-
dential weight is now limited." Auerbach, 499 F. Supp. at 1337.
The position that a presumption against student residency status for voting at
college violates the equal protection clause gains support from the Supreme Court's
affirmance of United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1978), af'd
mer., 439 U.S. 1105 (1979). The district court in United States v. Texas perma-
nently enjoined election officials from requiring that students go to any greater
lengths to prove domicile than non-students 445 F. Supp. 1245.
The Supreme Court has ruled that summary affirmances have precedential value,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974), and at least the Second Circuit has
concluded that they are binding on the lower courts of that circuit, Mercado v.
Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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The requisite intent is often expressed as an absence of an intention
to make a home elsewhere 57 and requires abandonment of one's
former domicile. 58 Generally, intent to make a place one's domicile is
proved by one's own declarations 59 and acts. 0 One's acts are to be
given the greatest weight as indicators of intent,6 ' followed by one's
Therefore, the Auerbach court concluded, "the Court's affirmance of United States
v. Texas, together with the reasoning in the Baesler-Whatley line of cases provides
ample support for [the] conclusion that [the plaintiff students] in this case have raised
a substantial 14th amendment challenge to New York's student registration scheme,"
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction against requiring
students to fill out a special questionnaire. 499 F. Supp. at 1338. At the time this
Comment went to print, the court was awaiting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.
57. See, e.g., Williamson, 232 U.S. at 624; Gallagher, 185 F.2d at 546; Re
Glassford's Estate, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 186, 249 P.2d 908, 911 (Ct. App. 1952) (no
intention to return to former place of abode); In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. at
277, 170 A. at 605; Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 500, 222 P.2d 1055, 1057
(1950).
58. See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 24 Del. Ch. 354, 379, 16 A.2d 772,
783 (1940) (abandonment with "intention not to return"), aff'd, 315 U.S. 343 (1942);
Schultz, 384 Ill. at 156, 51 N.E.2d at 144 (abandonment with "intention not to
return"); Shenton, 178 Md. at 534, 15 A.:2d at 909-10 (abandonment "so permanent
as to exclude the existence of an intention to return to the former place"); Means v.
Means, 145 Neb. 441, 444, 17 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1945) (permanent abandonment);
Shapiro v. State Tax Comm'n, 67 A.D.2d 191, 193, 415 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (3d Dep't
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y.2d 822, 407 N.E.2d 1330, 430 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1980); Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 449, 251 S.E.2d at 861; Reynolds, 177 N.C. at 415-16, 99
S.E. at 242 (permanent abandonment); Elwert v. Elwert, 196 Or. 256, 265, 248 P.2d
847, 851 (1952); Re Estate of McKinley, 337 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. 1975); 25 AM. JuR. 2D
Domicile § 24 (1966) (permanent abandonment).
59. See, e.g., Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co., 38 F. Supp. at 631 (oral
declaration made before a controversy existed); Slater v. Munroe, 313 Mass. 538,
546, 48 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1943) (written declarations in tax returns, deeds and
correspondence); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. at 168, 163 A. at 309 (written and
oral); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20 (1971) (Special Note
on Evidence for Establishment of a Domicile of Choice) [hereinafter cited as Special
Note on Evidence].
60. See, e.g., Jennings v. Fanti, 96 F. Supp. 264, 266 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. at 60; Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 169 Misc. 534, 537, 8
N.Y.S.2d 10, 13-14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. at
168, 163 A. at 309; see also Special Note on Evidence, supra note 59.
61. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. at 425; E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.
v. Byrnes, 101 F.2d 14, 14 (2d Cir. 1939); Jennings, 96 F. Supp. at 266; Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. at 60; Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1930); Coca-Cola Int'l Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 8 A.2d 511, 524 (Del. Ch.
1939) (conduct is the most important evidence of intention to acquire a domicile);
Shenton, 178 Md. at 533, 15 A.2d at 909; Pignatelli, 169 Misc. at 540, 8 N.Y.S.2d at
16; In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. at 168, 163 A. at 308 (expression of desire cannot
supersede effect of conduct in determining domicile); see also Special Note on Evi-
dence, supra note 59.
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informal statements (presumed not to be based upon any pre-con-
ceived design to fabricate)62 and one's formal statements. 3
Some states require intent to reside in a given locality "perma-
nently" or "indefinitely" before domicile can be acquired there.6 4
However, words such as "permanently" and "indefinitely" are not to
be taken literally in applying domicile principles 5 because our society
is more mobile than it was when these principles developed.6 6 In any
62. See Special Note on Evidence, supra note 59.
63. See, e.g., Townsend v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 144 F.2d 106, 109 (10th Cir. 1944)
(declaration is to be considered in the light of the motive of the one making it);
Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wenham, 146 F. 207, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1906) (self-serving
declarations should be accorded little, if any, weight); Watters v. Ralston Coal Co.,
38 F. Supp. 16, 17 (M.D. Pa. 1941) (weight to be given declarations is to be
determined by the time and circumstances under which they are made); see generally
Special Note on Evidence, supra note 59; 25 AM. JuR. 2D Domicile § 93 (1966); 28
C.J.S. Domicile § 18(b) (1941). But see Paulson, 238 N.W.2d at 350 (state election
code's definition of residence for voting purposes was changed from "the place which
he maintains as his home with the intent..." to "the place which he declares is his
home with the intent . . .") (emphasis added). However, the court stated that the
legislature's intent in changing the law was only to allow one's declarations to "tip
the scales" when his home may arguably be in either of two places. Id.
64. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-1-21-3(1) (Burns 1982); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
art. § 5.08(k) (Vernon Supp. 1982). See notes 111-12 infra for the text of these
statutes.
65. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 451 n.2 (1941);
Gallagher, 185 F.2d at 547 (court doubts that courts using the word "permanent" in
describing the requisite intention actually required permanency); Ramey, 348 F.
Supp. at 789 ("such expressions 'should not be taken literally' but rather capsulate the
many elements relevant to determining whether a person has made a place his
home") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 comment c
(1971)); Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 448, 251 S.E.2d at 863; cf. Bright, 336 F. Supp. at 533-
34 ("[a]dmittedly a student may not be able to state with certitude that he intends to
permanently live in the university community, but such a declaration is not necessary
to establish domicil"). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 797 (1972),
66. See, e.g., Ramey, 348 F. Supp. at 788 (ours is an increasingly mobile soci-
ety); accord Worden, 61 N.J. at 347-48, 294 A.2d at 244-45 ("[students] are no more
mobile than the general population, which has admittedly become quite restless");
Lloyd, 296 N.C. at 444, 251 S.E.2d at 861. See also Reiff, supra note 7, at 458:
[Domicile law] developed in an era in which people infrequently moved
from one location to another .... Almost everyone would return to [his]
original home when the reason for the absence was over. The notion arose
that one was legally identified with his place of birth and did not lose this
domicile until he took affirmative steps to establish a new one .... [C]ri-
teria, once useful in ascertaining. . . domicile, have become outmoded by
changes in modern life ....
Id.; ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 25-26 (improved transportation
has increased mobility for business, educational and leisure purposes; unfortunately
the absentee voting systems have not yet adequately adjusted to this increase).
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event, states may not constitutionally require more than that a person
"intend to make the place his home for the time at least.11
6 7
Although the requisite intent is often expressed as an absence of an
intent to live elsewhere, 8 a "floating intention"-vague possibility of
eventually going elsewhere or of returning to the former domicile 9-
will not destroy present domicile.70 However, a floating intention does
not include an intention to return upon the occurrence of some event
which can reasonably be anticipated. 7' Thus, since college graduation
is an event which can reasonably be anticipated, an intention to
return to a former residence after graduation is not a floating inten-
tion and will prevent establishment of a domicile at college.
72
IV. Current Application of Domicile Law
When applied to college students, common law domicile principles
often have been distorted so that a state or its subdivision can effectu-
ate its policy of either encouraging or discouraging student voting at
67. Rainey, 348 F. Supp. at 788 ("[t]he search in each instance is for the state to
which the person is most closely related at the time") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1971)). Accord Shivelhood, 336 F. Supp. at 1114;
Bright, 336 F. Supp. at 534 ("it is sufficient if the intention is to remain for an
indefinite period") (quoting 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicile § 25 (1964)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1971); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 797 (1972).
68. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Gates v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1952);
Rosenberg, 37 F.2d at 811; Knight, 291 F. 129, 133 (D. Mont. 1923) ("a mere present
expectation or hope to return . . .wholly dependent upon future state of mind");
McDowell v. Friedman Bros. Shoe Co., 135 Mo. App. 276, 288, 115 S.W. 1028, 1033
(1909) (citing J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 50 (8th ed. 1872)).
70. See, e.g., Gates, 199 F.2d at 294; Rosenberg, 37 F.2d at 811; Knight, 291 F.
at 133; Hiatt v. Lee, 48 Ariz. 320, 324, 61 P.2d 401, 402-03 (1936); Croop v. Walton,
199 Ind. 262, 270, 157 N.E. 275, 278 (1927); Shenton, 178 Md. at 532-33, 15 A.2d at
909; Reynolds, 177 N.C. at 422, 99 S.E. at 245; Redrow v. Redrow, 94 Ohio App.
38, 44, 114 N.E.2d 293, 296, 51 Ohio Ops. 266, 268 (Ct. App. 1952); Gardner, 118
Utah at 500, 222 P.2d at 1057.
71. See, e.g., Gates, 199 F.2d at 294; Knight, 291 F. at 133 (intent to return
upon the "contemplated happening of a contingency" does not change domicile);
Croop, 199 Ind. at 270, 157 N.E. at 278; McDowell, .135 Mo. App. at 288, 115 S.W.
at 1031, 1033 (removal from jurisdiction to restore daughter's health with intention
of returning upon her recovery did not change domicile); see also 25 AM. JuR. 2D
Domicile § 27 (1966).
72. See Rainey, 348 F. Supp. at 788 (one cannot have a domicile in a place "if he
has the intent to return to another that had been his home"); accord Bright, 336 F.
Supp. at 533 (court implies that presumption that students who intend to return to
their former homes do not acquire domicile at college does not violate equal protec-
tion).
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college. 73 Some courts point to factors which tend to show that stu-
dents are domiciled at college to justify allowing them to vote there.7 4
For example, students spend nine to ten months of the year at college,
are counted as residents of their college towns for census 75 and jury
73. Compare Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D.Pa. 1972)(students
should be allowed to vote in the college community if they physically live there and
intend it as their legal residence) [and] Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections,
61 N.J. 325, 350, 294 A.2d 233, 248 (1972) (Weintraub, J., concurring) ("[i]t is for
him alone to say whether his voting interests at the residence he selects exceed his
voting interests elsewhere") with Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 167, 146 N.E. 171,
173 (1925) (only students free from parental control, who regard college as their
home and have no other home to return to in case of sickness may vote at college)
[and] Michaud v. Yeomans, 115 N.J. Super. 200, 278 A.2d 537 (1971) (presumption
against students' acquisition of domicile at college). See note 92 injra for cases in
accord with the presumption doctrine.
The Sloane court failed to mention the domicile principles that (1) one's acts are to
prevail over one's declarations to the contrary and (2) abandonment of a domicile is a
prerequisite to acquisition of a new one. 351 F. Supp. 1299; see notes 58 and 61 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of these principles. Whether the court had
assumed these principles without discussing them or had deliberately overemphasized
the importance of the students' declarations of their intentions is uncertain; however,
it has established unsettling precedent.
The Worden court seems to have disregarded the abandonment requirement when
it declared all students eligible to vote at college, including those who "plan to return
to their previous residences." 61 N.J. at 348, 294 A.2d at 245.
Several commentators have argued that students should be given the right to vote
in their college communities regardless of their actual legal residence. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 49, at 45 (argues for a reevaluation of voting residence concepts because
the federal census, and thus congressional apportionment, hinges residence on pres-
ence only); 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 852, 860 (1973) (cites the incomplete extension of the
voting franchise to absentees and the complicated absentee registration procedures to
justify position that if students are not permitted to vote at college, they might be
completely denied an opportunity to vote); see also Singer, supra note 7, at 707-08
("students who have been in the university town long enough to meet the waiting
period, and who seek to register there, should be registered unless the registration
agency can show a good reason for not doing so"). This article was written before
residency waiting periods in excess of 30 days were declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text. Query whether this
author's position would be unchanged had residency waiting periods then been 30
days rather than 6 months or one year.
One commentator has suggested that the burden of proof of domicile should be
borne by the state because "it can best bear the brunt of a mistake." See Note,
Student Voting and the Constitution: New York State Bona Fide Residency Require-
ments, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 181 (1972). But see note 43 supra and accompanying
text (burden of proof presently on party alleging change of domicile).
74. See notes 75-79 infra and accompanying text.
75. See Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 689, 189 N.W.2d 423, 431 (1971);
Worden, 61 N.J. at 347, 294 A.2d at 244.
The Constitution requires congressional apportionment on the basis of the census.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the
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several States . . .according to their respective Numbers .... The actual Enumera-
tion shall be made ... within every ... Term of ten years . . . "); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State ..."). Apportionment requires a one-man, one-vote correlation. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See generally Auerbach, The Reapportionment
Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 1. There-
fore, it has been argued, student residency in college towns for census purposes, see
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 174, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REPORTS 2 (1968), should entitle them to vote there. See Guido, Student Voting
and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 47
N.Y.U. L. REV. 32, 52 (1972) (argues that excluding students from voting at colleges
overweights votes of non-students living in those districts and may violate Court's
equal apportionment decisions); Note, supra note 49, at 60; Note, States Cannot
Constitutionally Impose more Stringent Residency Requirements upon Students than
upon any Other Potential Voter, 60 GEo. L.J. 1115, 1123-24 1972 (emphasizes (1)
equal protection argument, (2) students' interest in college community and (3) that
one-man, one-vote principle is a compelling reason to allow students to vote at
college but that standing requirements prevent them from raising it (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 204), but does not discuss the common law principle that abandon-
ment of a domicile is a prerequisite to the establishment of a new one).
The Census Bureau, however, specifically disclaims any inference from its counts
as to the domicile of persons. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 3 (100th ed. 1979).
In determining residence, the Bureau of the Census counts each person as
an inhabitant of a usual place of residence (i.e., the place where one
usually eats and sleeps). While this place is not necessarily a person's legal
residence or voting residence, the use of these different bases of classifica-
tion should produce the same results in the vast majority of cases.
Id. Moreover, in 1971 the Third Circuit determined that being counted by the census
in a particular place is not conclusive proof of domicile there. See Borough of Bethel
Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Reiff, supra note 7, at 467
n.89. In 1950 the Census Bureau decided to begin counting college students at their
college addresses rather than at their parents' addresses. Id.
The change was made because many college students were not being
included on their parents' census forms and the method used for fixing
"other groups in society with two 'homes"' for census purposes was "the
place in which they generally eat, sleep and work ...... The change does
not reflect any attempt to ascertain domicile. Census standards represent a
"photographic picture" of the location of the population taken within a
relatively narrow frame of time. Thus, while college students should be
counted in this manner, no inference should be drawn as to their actual
domicile.
Id. at 469 (citing Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 578-80). Two years later, the
Supreme Court concluded that even precise compliance with census figures will not
produce exactly equally-weighted votes because those figures include persons ineligi-
ble to vote, such as "nonresident students." See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
746-47 (1973):
[The Census] may not actually reflect the body of voters whose votes must
be counted and weighed for the purpose of reapportionment, because
"census persons" are not voters. . .. The proportion of the census popula-
tion too young to vote or disqualified by alienage or non-residence varies
substantially . . . .(Above enumerated) figures tell us nothing of the other
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duty purposes,7 6 are subject to local laws, 77 pay local gasoline and
sales taxes78 and, where renting rooms in private dwellings, indirectly
pay property taxes through increased rents.
79
To the extent that courts have relied upon facts tending to show
that students as a class are domiciled at college" in striking down state
voting statutes as violative of students' equal protection rights,8' they
may have improperly classified students as bona fide residents.8 2 Per-
sons who maintain two or more residences also may exhibit the same
indications of domiciliary status that students do.83 However, coupled
with these manifestations of intent to acquire a domicile must be
corresponding manifestations of intent to abandon a former domicile
or no change occurs.84
Although courts and legal scholars agree that domicile principles
must be complied with to ensure that only bona fide residents vote,
85
these principles often have not been applied equally to students and
non-students.86
ineligibles making up substantially equal census populations among elec-
tion districts: aliens, non-resident military personnel, non-resident stu-
dents, for example.
Id.; cf. Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 791 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (one-man,
one-vote doctrine requires correspondence between the number of people, not voters,
living in a district and the number of its representatives). Thus, a student's residence
at college, although pertinent for census purposes, should not entitle him, without
more, to vote there.
76. See Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at 431.
77. See Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1304; Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at
431; Worden, 61 N.J. at 347, 294 A.2d at 244.
78. See Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at 431-32; Worden, 61 N.J. at
347, 294 A.2d at 244.
79. See Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at 431-32 (property taxes are
ultimately paid by student renters); cf. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 210
(1970) (significant part of property tax is paid by tenants).
80. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1299, 1304; Worden, 61 N.J. at 348, 350,
294 A.2d at 245, 248 (discussed at note 73 supra); see also notes 75-79 supra and
accompanying text.
82. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
83. A person owning two residences pays property, sales, and gasoline taxes in
both places and is subject to the local laws of both places. However, he may only vote
in one place-his domicile. Where he wishes to vote at the later-acquired residence,
he must show that he has abandoned the original residence, at least to the extent that
he now calls the later-acquired residence home. See notes 57-58 supra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of domicile abandonment.
84. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 36 supra. But see discussion of McCoy v. McLeroy, 348 F. Supp.
1034 (M.D. Ga. 1972), note 55 supra.
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Non-students have generally been permitted to register upon a
minimal showing of intent to remain, coupled with a consistent decla-
ration. 87 By contrast, students have been held to higher standards of
proof of domicile. 8 To preserve the equal protection rights of stu-
dents, all registration applicants must be held to the same standard of
proof.8 9 Two possible means to this end are evident: either raise the
standard of proof as applied to non-students, or lower the standard of
proof as applied to students. Although a greater administrative bur-
den accompanies raising the standard of proof as applied to non-
students, this solution protects the states' right of ensuring that only
bona fide residents vote90 and upholds the equal protection rights of
students. 91 An examination of the differences among various states'
domicile laws applicable to students for the purpose of voting will
help to illustrate the necessity for this remedy.
A. "No Gain or Loss' Provisions
One cause for the disparate treatment of students can be traced to
the "no gain or loss" statutes of many states, similar to New York's:
87. See, e.g., Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1304 (non-students were registered after
only showing an address within the district and an occupation); Worden, 61 N.J. at
348, 294 A.2d at 245 (non-students "were freely registered though their situations
indicated that they were comparably short-term residents"); cf. Whatley v. Clark,
482 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1973), (prospective non-student voters were not subject
to presumption of nonresidency); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 686, 189 N.W.2d at 431
(court noted that disinterested non-students could vote while many interested stu-
dents could not); see also note 32 supra and accompanying text.
88. See note 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
89. The student who has abandoned his pre-college domicile in favor of his
college residence is domiciled at college. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
Although this type of person may arguably be among the minority of college stu-
dents, holding him to a higher standard of proof of domicile than is required of non-
students is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. See
cases cited in note 95 infra.
Constitutionally, all students should be presumed to be as eligible to vote as
college-area residents as are non-students. Students who allege a change of domicile
must show it by their acts, see note 60 supra and accompanying text, which are given
greater weight than their statements, see note 61 supra and accompanying text.
Where the facts do not show an abandonment of the pre-college domicile, the
student should not be allowed to vote at college. Where the facts do show such an
abandonment, the equal protection clause requires that he be allowed to vote at
college. See note 156 infra and accompanying text for suggested scope of and proce-
dure for questioning voting applicants.
90. To lower the standards of proof as applied to students increases the risk that
non-domiciliaries will vote. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
91. If all applicants are held to the same standard of proof, no claim of equal
protection can be seriously entertained.
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"[f]or the purpose of registering and voting no person shall be deemed
to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence
. . . while a student of any institution of learning." 92 These provisions
seem to raise a presumption against student domiciliary status in the
college community. 3 However, any presumption against a student's
capacity to establish a domicile at college is not factually justified94
and therefore violates equal protection.95
The New York State Court of Appeals, in Palla v. Suffolk County
Board of Elections,96 declared that the state's "no gain or loss" provi-
92. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-104(1) (McKinney 1978); see note 2 supra for citations of
remaining 11 states with "no gain or loss" provisions.
New York's "no gain or loss" provision was first interpreted in Silvey v. Lindsay,
107 N.Y. 55, 59-61, 13 N.E. 444, 445-46 (1887). The court held that the provision
disqualifies no one from voting, but "simply eliminates from those circumstances [of
domicile] the fact of presence in the institution named ...... Id. at 61, 13 N.E. at
446. Thus, a student desiring to vote was required to prove domicile by means other
than his presence. Id.
The Silvey court's language was interpreted as having established a rebuttable
presumption against bona fide student residency at college. See Note, supra note 73,
at 163-64. Later New York cases adhered to that presumption. See, e.g., In re
Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 287, 40 N.E. 769, 770 (1895) ("the facts to establish such a
change [of domicile] . .. should be very clear and convincing to overcome the
natural presumption" that the student's domicile has not changed); In re Blankford,
241 N.Y. 180, 149 N.E. 416 (1925); In re Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, 41 N.E. 439 (1895);
Hoffman v. Bachman, 187 Misc. 799, 804, 65 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1946) (the "established law over the years" created a natural but rebuttable
presumption that a person who has left home to attend college is on a "temporary
sojourn as a student").
93. Wilkins, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423. But see Ramey, 348 F. Supp. at
786; Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 48, 286 N.E.2d 247,
252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 867 (1972) (discussed in note 106 infra).
94. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Whatley, 482 F.2d at 1234; Auerbach v. Kinley, 499 F. Supp. 1329, 1342
(N.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Texas, 344 F. Supp. 1245, 1257, 1261 (S.D. Tex.
1978), aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 1105 (1979); Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1304-05; New-
berger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559, 563 (D.N.H. 1972) (state's "intention to remain
indefinitely" test violates equal protection); Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 534
(E.D. Ky. 1971); Wilkins, 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434; Worden, 61 N.J. at
348, 294 A.2d at 245; accord Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (D. Vt.
1971) (students must not be required to answer a supplemental questionnaire unless
all others are also required to do so; it must not be designed only to apply to
students); Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971)
(presumption that students are domiciled at parents' homes violates twenty-sixth
amendment); Paulson v. Forest City Community School Bd., 238 N.W.2d 344, 350
(Iowa 1976) (students establish domicile in the same manner as non-students). But see
Ramey, 348 F. Supp. at 786; Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 442-43, 251 S.E.2d 843,
860-61 (1979); Palla, 31 N.Y.2d at 48-49, 286 N.E.2d at 252-53, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 868
("no gain or loss" provision "raises no presumption for or against student residency"
even though students may constitutionally be "subject to a unique line of inquiry").
96. 31 N.Y.2d 36, 286 N.E.2d 247, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1972).
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sion "raises no presumption for or against residency."'0 7 Palla suggests
that this statute means that presence alone at college is insufficient to
establish domicile there. 98 However, the common law domicile princi-
ples, 99 of which the Palla court was no doubt aware, clearly require
an intent to make the asserted domicile one's home. 100 Thus, these
principles would obviate the need for a "no gain or loss" provision as
interpreted by Palla.101
The precise wording of the "no gain or loss" provisions is signifi-
cant. While New York officials can argue that that state's provision
merely requires more than presence at college to establish domicile,102
the wording of the similar provisions of two other states does not
support such an argument. 10 3 Typical is Oregon's constitution: "[f]or
the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost
a residence . . . while a student of any Seminary of Learning."10 4 The
statute makes no mention of presence, thereby precluding the argu-
ment that it means simply that presence alone is not sufficient to
establish domicile.
Six of the states with "no gain or loss" provisions have included
"solely" before "by reason of his presence or absence." 105 This addition
to the "no gain or loss" provisions of the other states would clarify the
meaning of those provisions and would better support the judicial
interpretation that the provision is neutral. 10 6 Further, if the legisla-
97. Id. at 48, 286 N.E.2d at 252-53, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
98. Id. at 47-48, 286 N.E.2d at 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 867 ("physical presence,
without more, . . . is ... evidence merely of an intention to reside temporarily [for
the purpose of attending college]") (citing New York's "no gain or loss" provision).
99. See notes 38-42 & 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
101. This is true if the asserted intentions of students are to be given as much
credence as those of non-students.
102. In fact the Palla court goes further by stating that "facts supportive of ... a
[claimed] change must be wholly independent of ... presence at ... college.
31 N.Y.2d at 48, 286 N.E.2d at 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
103. See note 104 infra and accompanying text; ALA. CODE § 17-3-6 (1970).
104. OR. CONST. art. II, § 4 (1981). This creates a rebuttable presumption against
student residency at college. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Or. 585, 603, 155 P.2d
293, 300 (1945) ("no gain or loss" provision listing military personnel and students
interpreted as it applies to military personnel).
105. See note 2 supra.
106. Federal and state courts in New York have recently asserted that the provi-
sion is neutral. See Ramey, 348 F. Supp. at 786 ("[t]he words say to us only that
presence . . .as a student . . .is not alone sufficient to supply, nor is absence ...
alone sufficient to lose, the required mental element"); Palla, 31 N.Y.2d at 48, 286
N.E.2d at 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 867 ("the statute is entirely neutral and has always
been construed as such"); accord Whittington v. Board of Elections, 320 F. Supp.
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tures of the states with "no gain or loss" provisions really intend that
student status have no bearing on the domicile issue, they should
amend those provisions to read as that of Wisconsin: "[s]tudent status
shall not be a consideration in determining residence for the purpose
of establishing voter eligibility,"10 7 or that of California: "[t]his ['no
gain or loss' provision] shall not be construed to prevent a student at
an institution of learning from qualifying as an elector in the locality
where he or she domiciles while attending that institution, when in
fact the student has abandoned his or her former domicile." 108
B. Other Statutes Restricting Student Voting
Although the "no gain or loss" provisions do not completely bar
students from establishing a voting residence at college, 109 they are not
the only statutory hurdle these students must overcome. 110 For exam-
ple, a student wishing to establish a voting residence in an Indiana
college town must intend to make that place his "permanent"
home.I'I Texas has a similar statute precluding a student from acquir-
ing a domicile at college "unless he intends to remain there and to
make that place his home indefinitely after he ceases to be a stu-
dent."" 2 Although this statute was held violative of equal protec-
tion, 113 a local Texas election official continued to require only stu-
dents to complete a questionnaire. 114 Based upon this and other
889, 891, 893 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) ("no gain or loss" statute is neutral). But see note 92
supra for a discussion of the rebuttable presumption against student residency estab-
lished by earlier New York courts' interpretations of the "no gain or loss" provision.
107. Wis. STAT. § 6.10(12) (1982 Supp.) See also 61 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 256
(1972).
108. CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 206 (West 1977); cf. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-2-104
(1973).
109. See note 2 supra.
110. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text.
111. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-1-21-3(1) (Burns 1982) ("[a] person shall not be
considered to have gained a residence in any county into which he has come for...
educational . . . purposes merely without the intention of making such county his
permanent home").
112. See TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. § 5.08(k) (Vernon Supp. 1982) ("[a] student
shall not be considered to have acquired a residence at the place where he lives while
attending school unless he intends to remain there and to make that place his home
indefinitely after he ceases to be a student").
113. See Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
114. See United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (election
official permanently enjoined from using student questionnaire), aff'd mem., 439
U.S. 1105 (1979). The state's chief election officer "unequivocally" stated that the
statute struck down "created a 'special classification' that served no purpose other
than to discourage students from voting." Whatley, 482 F.2d at 1234.
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evidence" l5 that the official continued to apply a presumption of
student non-residency, the Supreme Court recently affirmed an order
permanently enjoining him from using the questionnaire.116
C. Effect on the Student
While a student may possess the requisite intent to effect a change
of domicile to the college community "for the time at least," 117 he may
also possess such an intent when he intends to move from there at a
definite time."l8 However, since acquisition of a domicile is contingent
upon abandonment of a former domicile,"" domicile common law
arguably precludes a student who intends to return to his previous
residence upon graduation from acquiring a domicile at college, un-
der the presumption that he has not completely abandoned that
former residence. 120
V. Meaningful Enfranchisement of College Students Requires
that Uniform National Domicile Standards
Be Applied in Each State
The domicile laws of four states provide substantially that if a
person "moves into another state with the intention of making it his
residence he loses his residence in this state."121 In two of these states,
this result occurs even though the person intends to return at some
future time. 122
115. United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. at 1259 (voting registrar refused to
register students who previously lived outside of county and had not secured a post-
college job in the county).
116. Id. at 1261.
117. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Ramey, 348 F. Supp. at 788; Newberger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp.
559 (D.N.H. 1972); Paulson, 238 N.W.2d at 349 (a person may be considered
domiciled in a place even if he intends to remain there "for a definite ... length of
time") (upholding IowA CODE ANN. § 47.4(4) (West 1973)); Worden, 61 N.J. at 348,
294 A.2d at 245 (court ordered election officials to register those students who desired
to vote at college, including "those who plan to return to their previous residences");
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 comment b (1971). But
see Palla, 31 N.Y.2d at 50, 286 N.E.2d at 254, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (restricting right
to vote to students who intend New York as their "permanent home").
119. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
121. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-112(6) (1981); accord MINN. STAT. ANN. §
200.031(d) (West Supp. 1982) ("[i]f an individual goes into another state or precinct
with the intention of making it his home, or files an affidavit of residency there for
election purposes, he loses his residence in his former precinct"); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3503.02(E) (Page 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2814(e) (Purdon 1963).
122. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(F) (Page 1972); accord MINN. STAT. ANN. §
200.031(e) (West Supp. 1982).
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Persons from these four states lose their domicile, and thus their
voting right, upon removal from the state with an intention of resid-
ing in another state. However, if they are students, their move to a
state with a "no gain or loss" provision is not necessarily sufficient to
establish a voting residence there. 23 Such students may be effectively
barred from voting anywhere. 24 Additionally, students faced with
this dilemma may decide that challenging the law is not worth the
effort. 25 These obstacles are clearly contrary to the congressional
intent to enfranchise students.126
Under Michigan law, students domiciled in that state become disen-
franchised if they leave a domicile in Michigan to attend an out-of-
state college. A person's domicile for Michigan voting purposes is at
"that place at which such person resides the greater part of the
time .... ,127 This definition disenfranchises students originally
123. See notes 92-102 supra and accompanying text.
124. The danger of not being permitted to vote may be even greater when the vote
is to be cast by absentee ballot. See notes 133-44 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of absentee voting laws and procedures that restrict and impede absentee
voting by students.
125. See S. REP. No. 26, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971) (discussed at note 126
infra); Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 578, 488 P.2d 1, 9, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 704-
05 (1971) (discussed at note 147 infra); ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAW, supra note 16,
at 50 (restrictive registration systems probably reduce "the number of qualified
absentees who bother to register").
126. See notes 10, 29 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
The Voting Rights Act of 1970 gave 18-year-olds the right to vote in all federal,
state and local elections. The Supreme Court limited the Act to federal elections,
ruling that federal legislation regulating the voting age in state and local elections
violated states' tenth amendment rights. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (5-4
decision). This decision prompted the enactment of the twenty-sixth amendment.
In considering the unsatisfactory result of dual-age voting in those states whose
laws did not permit 18-year-olds to vote, the Senate report on the twenty-sixth
amendment stated:
[F]orcing young voters to undertake special burdens-obtaining absentee
ballots, or travelling to one centralized location in each city, for exam-
ple-in order to exercise their right to vote might well serve to dissuade
them from participating in the election. This result, and the election
procedures that create it, are at least inconsistent with the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act, which sought to encourage greater political participa-
tion on the part of the young; such segregation might even amount to a
denial of their 14th Amendment right to equal protection of the laws in
the exercise of the franchise.
S. REP. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971).
127. In Michigan, residence is defined as:
[T]hat place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal
effects and has a regular place of lodging. If a person have more than 1
residence . . . that place at which the person resides the greater part of the
time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.11(a) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
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domiciled in Michigan who consider themselves domiciliaries of that
state while attending college in a state that will not allow them to vote
due to their "nonresident" status there.128 It also disregards the com-
mon law principle that a domicile may not be acquired until a former
domicile has been abandoned.12
These examples indicate that conflicting state standards might dis-
enfranchise students. 130 To avoid such a result, uniform standards for
determining voting residence must be applied in all states.' 3' This
proposal will be discussed later in this Comment.
32
VI. Absentee Ballot Voting Laws
The absentee voting laws and procedures of many states present
serious obstacles 133 to the full realization of the congressional intent 
34
to enfranchise college students. For example, in Delaware, Illinois,
New Jersey, and Oklahoma absentee registration is not authorized for
students. 35 Two absentee voting studies have found that this require-
ment presents a formidable and unnecessary obstacle to voting for a
128. See Reiff, supra note 7, at 464 n.74.
129. Merely by residing the greater part of the time at a later-acquired residence
does not necessarily mean that one has abandoned the earlier-acquired residence. See
note 58 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the abandonment require-
ment.
130. See notes 121-29 supra for examples of how conflicting state domicile laws
might disenfranchise students.
131. Whether the federal government has authority to legislate uniform standards
for determining voting residence when conflicting state standards make disenfranch-
isement of voters possible is an open question. See notes 158-61 infra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of state and federal authority in this area.
132. See notes 158-61 infra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 135-38, 140 & 143-44 infra and accompanying text. See also ABSEN-
TEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 1, 31-39 (absentee registration and absen-
tee voting procedures of some states result in excluding a large number of eligible
voters from voting; efficient absentee voting administration is impaired by inade-
quate and outdated equipment and procedures and inadequate funding and staff-
ing). The study recommends (1) centralizing state administration of registration and
voting, (2) including a distinct staff to handle absentee voting and (3) installing a
computer system with terminals in each election district. Id. at 57. It also calls for
comprehensive federal absentee standards. Id. at 64-65. Accord NATIONAL MUNICI-
PAL LEAGUE, MODEL CIVILIAN ABSENTEE VOTING LAW 10 (4th Tentative Draft 1959)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL VOTING LAW] (state-centralized handling of absentee
ballots would reduce fraud possibilities and increase efficiency).
134. See notes 10 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
135. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 15, § 1901 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 4-10
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (in counties of less than 500,000 pop.); id. § 5-9 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982) (in counties of more than 500,000 pop.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-
6 (West 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 4-111 (West 1982).
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student who moves to a college far from his home before register-
ing. '3 In Missouri, absentee voting is not authorized in elections
wherein only township officers are elected 137 and in North Dakota
absentee voting is not permitted in special elections. 38
Although most states do provide for absentee voting in general,
primary, municipal, district, and special elections, 139 administrative
procedures that students must follow 40 might dissuade them from
voting.14 ' Moreover, persuading county election boards to cooperate
136. See ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 55 (recommending
voters' option of registration by mail); MODEL VOTING LAW, supra note 133, at 6
(recommending voters' option of registration by mail with verifiable proof required
for initial registration). "An absentee law, no matter how broad, that does not permit
mailed registration, may not function properly." Id.
137. See 96 Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. (1953).
138. See State ex rel. Lanier v. Hall, 74 N.D. 426, 429, 434, 23 N.W.2d 44, 46, 49
(1946).
139. See, e.g., People ex rel. Seegren v. Sackett, 351 Ill. 363, 377, 184 N.E. 646,
653 (1933) (park district elections); Crowe v. Emmert, 305 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1957)
(primary elections); Binetti v. Swenson, 3 N.J. Super. 227, 229, 66 A.2d 42, 43 (1949)
(military service absentees in special elections); Phillips v. Slaughter, 209 N.C. 543,
183 S.E. 897 (1936) (municipal elections); Woods v. State, 133 Tex. 110, 126 S.W.2d
4 (1939) (municipal elections). See generally 26 AM. JuR. 2D Elections § 246 (1966)
(explicitly stating this as majority rule). But see Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 257, §§ 10-14
(1964) ("some questions have been raised" about applicability of absentee voting laws
to elections other than general and primary).
140. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102(3) (1979) (student must supply proof
of full-time enrollment at college, signed by the chief administrative officer).
Some states require that the absentee voter's affidavit on his ballot be notarized or
certified. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.2 (West Supp. 1982); IND. STAT. ANN. §§
3-1-22-6, -7 (1982); see also ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 90.
Once an absentee voter has been registered, however, the utility of requiring that his
ballot be notarized is far outweighed by the inconvenience to him. See id. at 90. A
comparison of his ballot's signature with that on his registration form better serves to
prevent fraudulent voting. Id. at 68; MODEL VOTING LAW, supra note 133, at 8, 13;
Cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 1007, 1015 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982) (once person is
registered, a signature comparison is deemed sufficient when he applies for an
absentee ballot and when he marks his ballot).
New York requires that applications for absentee ballots be on forms supplied by
the Board of Elections. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-44(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983). There is no legitimate reason why applications for absentee ballots can not be
acceptable in any written form if sufficient information is contained therein to
permit verification of registration. See ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16,
at 66 (recommending such a change).
141. See Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 578, 488 P.2d 1, 9, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697,
704-05 (1971):
Although our statutes provide for absentee registration as well as absentee
voting (Elec. Code, § 213), it is likely that individuals forced to vote in
elections they care and know little about will be inclined not to register or
vote at all . . . . Forcing young voters to register at fictional residences
would therefore frustrate the legislative intent "to promote and encourage
voter registrations ......
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with requests by student voter registration organizations 4 2 for ample
amounts of registration forms can be a difficult task. 43
Permeating all of the encumbrances and restrictions on the full
enfranchisement of students is the generally accepted principle that
absentee voting is a privilege and not a right.1 44 It appears that if a
person wants to vote in his college community, he must be prepared to
bear possibly onerous administrative burdens or be prepared to travel
home to exercise that right.145 The principle that absentee voting is a
Id.; S. REP. No. 126, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, (1971); ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS,
supra note 16, at 50 (restrictive registration system probably reduce "the number of
qualified absentees who bother to register"); accord United States v. Texas, 445 F.
Supp. 1245, 1254 (S.D, Tex. 1978), aff'd mem., 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (quoting S.
REP. No. 126, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)).
142. Many colleges participate in mass voter registration drives. Students must
then procure absentee ballots through individual application. See note 143 infra and
accompanying text.
143. For example, the New York Student Voter Registration Drive faced obstacles
such as non-compliance or partial and tardy compliance of many of the larger
counties' election boards with the request of the State Election Board in 1976 that
100,000 mail registration forms be delivered to a central location for distribution by
the group to each of the almost 200 campuses in the state.
Typical responses of county boards were that forms were too expensive to
send out in large quantities, that all of the students who were interested in
voting had already registered, or that the board had already given out an
adequate number of forms.
Due to the problems in receiving an adequate number of forms and an
absentee ballot procedure that is unfairly complicated, a large number of
students who attempted to exercise their legal right to vote were disenfran-
chised. During late September and all of October, the Drive received over
500 individual complaints from students who either had not been regis-
tered or had not been allowed to cast an absentee ballot. It should be
noted that this figure does not reflect the number of people who were so
frustrated by the system that they thought a complaint would be futile.
D. Hopkins, Testimony before the N.Y. State Assembly Select Committee on Election
Law (Nov. 22, 1976) (as reprinted by the New York Student Voter Registration
Drive) (on file at Fordham Law School Library).
144. See, e.g., Anderson v. Canvassing and Election Bd. of Gadsden County, 399
So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Hallahan v. Mittlebeeler, 373 S.W.2d 726,
727 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Wichelmann v. City of Glencoe, 200 Minn. 62, 66, 273
N.W. 638, 640 (1937); State ex rel. Bushmeyer v. Cahill, 575 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978); State ex rel. Van Horn v. Lyon, 119 Mont. 212, 217-18, 173 P.2d
891, 893 (1946); McMaster v. Wilkinson, 145 Neb. 39, 47, 15 N.W.2d 348, 353
(1944); DeFlesco v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 495, 129
A.2d 38, 40 (1957); Colaneri v. McNab, 90 Misc. 2d 742, 744, 395 N.Y.S.2d 980, 983
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1975); Portmann v. Board of Elections, 60 Ohio App. 54,
59, 19 N.E.2d 531, 534, 13 Ohio Ops. 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1938); Brown v. Dakota
Pub. Serv. Co., 68 S.D. 169, 174, 299 N.W. 569, 573 (1941); Fugate v. Buffalo, 348
P.2d 76, 83-84 (Wyo. 1960). See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 264, § 3 (1964); 26
AM. JuR. 2D Elections § 243 (1966).
145. Administrative negligence causing delay in supplying absentee ballots may
result in disenfranchisement of absentees. For example, in Colanari v. McNab, a
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privilege and not a right frustrates the congressional intent to enfran-
chise students. 146
Although absentee ballot systems may not provide for voting in all
elections and administrative procedures may tend to discourage ab-
sentee voting at all, election officials are not justified in allowing all
students to vote as domiciliaries of the college community. A state's
duty to ensure that all voters of the relevant district are bona fide
residents may not be compromised. 147 Therefore, as to students who
are not bona fide residents of their college communities, the absentee
voting franchise should be extended to all elections and the system
should be administered more efficiently. 148
VII. Recommended Solution
A. Clarify the Fundamental Principles of Law
All legislation and governmental publications pertaining to college
student voting rights must be carefully drafted to state clearly the
precise legal connotations of the words "domicile" and "residence" in
the voting context. 149 Such a clarification is essential to inform stu-
dents properly of their voting rights.' 50
A recent proposal' 15 that states print an "Explanation to Regis-
trants" in a pamphlet for distribution to first-time registrants should
printing error and judicial restraining orders postponing mailing of ballots to accom-
modate independent nominating petitions caused delay resulting in absentee voters
receiving ballots only four and five days before elections and the return of 150
marked ballots (58 of which could have tied the election) after the deadline. The
court refused to void the election, declaring that, as matter of law, ballots were not
mailed late because the Board of elections substantially complied with the law
requiring mailing of ballots "as soon as practicable." 90 Misc. 2d 742, 395 N.Y.S.2d
980 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1975). In Portmann v. Board of Elections, the court
found the wording of a referendum misleading and ordered it resubmitted to voters.
However, the court stated, absentee voters who had voted in the first submission but
were unable to vote in the second may be disenfranchised because "[t]hey must take
the situation as they find it. If they have absented themselves . . . at the time the
issue is presented properly, they have [done so] at their own risk." 60 Ohio App. 54,
60, 19 N.E.2d 531, 534, 13 Ohio Ops. 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1938).
146. See notes 10 & 29 supra and accompanying text for discussions of the congres-
sional intent to enfranchise students.
147. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. But see Jolicoeur, 5 Cal. 3d at 578,
488 P.2d at 9, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 704-05 (suggesting that forcing students to vote by
absentee 'ballot will discourage them from voting at all, thereby frustrating congres-
sional intent to encourage voting) (dictum).
148. See note 172 infra for a recommended solution.
149. See notes 38-42, 57, 58 & 64-71 supra and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of domicile and residence.
150. See notes 10 & 29 supra for a discussion of the congressional intent to
encourage student voting.
151. See Reiff, supra note 7, at 474-79.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
be implemented. 152 This pamphlet would contain (1) an explanation
of the requirements for and consequences of changing voting residence
and (2) examples of persons, including college students, eligible and
ineligible to vote in a given locale.I5 3 The literature would be distrib-
uted on college campuses in September of each year so that sufficient
time is allowed for processing requests for registration applications. 54
In addition, election officials must be better educated concerning
domicile law. Since they are required to apply domicile principles in
determining voter eligibility, 155 election officials must be better in-
formed on what it takes to be eligible to vote in a certain place and
how to consistently and equitably apply these rules. Procedures and
presumptions used in determining domicile should be equally applied
to students and non-students. 56
B. Create Uniform Voter Residency Standards
To avoid the possibility of disenfranchising students due to conflict-
ing state laws, 57 uniform standards for determining voting residence
152. Id. The pamphlet would be useful to non-students as well as to students.
153. Id. Such a pamphlet is currently in use in Delaware and has been well
received. Id. at 475 n.129.
154. Distribution early in the fall semester is especially important in the case of
absentee voting because registration is a prerequisite to the issuance of an absentee
ballot in all but three states. See ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 42-
48 (North Dakota does not require registration; Ohio requires registration only in
counties of over 16,000; Wisconsin requires registration only in municipalities of over
5,000 or by local option for others).
155. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
156. Initially, only routine questions must be allowed, two of the first being "Do
you intend that this be your only home for the time at least?" and "How long have
you lived here?" The minimum duration not justifying suspicion is a matter of local
discretion. This period may not be unreasonably long. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1971) (Court suggests that three month period may be unreasonable). The
same standards must be applied to all voters. If an applicant's answer justifies
suspicion, other questions reasonably calculated to ascertain domicile should be asked
until the registrar has a reasonable basis for concluding whether or not the applicant
is eligible to register. Cf. Bright, 336 F. Supp. at 533 ("the questions should reasona-
bly relate to proof of domicile"); United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. at 1255
(quoting Bright).
The facts that a student (1) lives in a college dorm and (2).is supported by parents
are not enough to preclude a finding of domicile at college, Shivelhood, 336 F. Supp.
at 1115, but these facts may be considered with other relevant evidence. Id. Lack of
an in-state driver's license or car registration is irrelevant unless the applicant has a
license or registration in another state. Id; accord United States v. Texas, 445 F.
Supp. at 1256 (quoting Shivelhood).
157. See notes 121-29 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how con-
flicting state laws might result in disenfranchisement of student voters.
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must be applied in all states. Federal voting legislation is preferable to
state legislation because a uniform law would eliminate the possibility
of such conflicts.
An unresolved constitutional question is the extent of federal au-
thority to legislate with respect to state and local elections.' 58 States
possess broad discretion in the control of state electoral procedures.159
However, state power to regulate elections is subject to the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause.160 Under this clause courts have
struck down unequal treatment of students and non-students in voting
rights cases. 16' It is possible that these cases and prior Supreme Court
cases that have limited, through the fourteenth amendment, state
power over state elections 1 2 have significantly circumscribed state
158. The scope of the federal government's authority under the fourteenth amend-
ment to legislate with respect to elections is uncertain. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (fourteenth
amendment "does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or
federal elections"); id. at 278 (Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (framers of fourteenth amendment intended it to be broadly
construed; it is "too vague and imprecise to provide us with sure guidance"); id. at
135 (Black, J.) (fourteenth amendment does not give Congress authority to regulate
state elections).
See note 162 infra for examples of how the Court has circumscribed state authority
over state elections. See also text accompanying note 163 infra.
159. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124-25 (opinion of Black, J.)
(Constitution's framers intended states "to keep for themselves, as provided in the
Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections"); id. at 201 (opinion of Harlan,
J.) (fourteenth amendment did not limit state power over voter qualifications);
Carrington, 380 U.S. at 91 ("States have long been held to have broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised")
(quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)). See also
U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people").
160. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 422 ("'[o]nce the franchise is
granted . . . lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause"') (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. at 655);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. at 629 (same); Carrington, 380 U.S. at
92-94.
161. See notes 30 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Kolodzieiski, 399 U.S. at 208-09 (state had no compelling interest in
restricting right to vote for or against approval of general obligation bonds to real
property taxpayers); Evans, 398 U.S. at 422, 426 (state had no compelling interest in
preventing residents of federal enclave located within state borders from voting in
state elections); Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 704, 706 (state had no compelling interest in
restricting right to vote for or against approval of municipal revenue bonds to real
property taxpayers); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627-28 (state had no compelling interest in
restricting right to vote in school district elections to real property taxpayers and
parents of schoolchildren); Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96 (state's absolute denial of right
to vote as domiciliaries to military personnel violated equal protection).
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power over the electoral process to the point where a reevaluation of
the scope of federal and state authority is compelled. 63 Hence, Con-
gress arguably has the power, under the fourteenth amendment, to
enact uniform voting residency standards if states' domicile and elec-
tion laws conflict and result in disenfranchisement of students. Addi-
tional support can be found in the enforcement clause of the twenty-
sixth amendment. 164 However, these arguments are tenuous due to the
broad discretion traditionally accorded states, under the tenth amend-
ment,6 5 in the control of the electoral process. 66
C. Formulate a Uniform Absentee Voting Law
Since not all students are eligible to vote as residents at college,6 7
absentee voting laws should be revised to ensure absentee voting
rights. Federal absentee voting legislation is preferable to state legisla-
tion because a uniform law would eliminate the possibility that absen-
tee voters might be disenfranchised due to conflicting states' laws.
The constitutionality of federal legislation, under the fourteenth
amendment, regulating absentee voting in state and local elections
presents the same uncertainty as in the case of uniform voting resi-
dency standards. 68 However, Congress arguably has the authority to
pass uniform absentee voting laws under the twenty-sixth amendment
if the current state absentee laws and procedures impose restrictions
and burdens on student voting that rise to the level of an abridg-
163. See note 162 supra for descriptions of how Kramer, Cipriano, Evans,
Kolodziejski and Carrington have circumscribed states' power over state and local
elections. See also Note, supra note 73, at 170 (author suggests this possibility); cf.
Gardner & Ebers, Federal Protections of Individual Rights in Local Elections, 13 J.
MAR. L. REV. 503, 533 (1979-80) (federal court review of state electoral processes has
decreased state power in this area).
164. See U.S. CONST. amend XXVI, § 2 ("[t]he Congress shall have the power to
enforce this act by appropriate legislation"). The twenty-sixth amendment is proba-
bly more solid ground for federal authority in this area because, unlike the fourteenth
amendment, this amendment speaks specifically of voting, and its legislative history
indicates that encouraging college-student voting was a major reason for its enact-
ment. See notes 10 & 29 supra for discussions of the congressional intent to encourage
student voting.
165. See note 159 supra for the text of the tenth amendment.
166. See note 159 supra for a discussion of state authority over elections; see note
158 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the uncertainty of federal
authority in this area.
167. Only those students who have abandoned their pre-college domiciles are
eligible to vote at college. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
.68. See notes 158-63 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of federal and
state authority in the area of voting residency standards.
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ment.1 6 9 If Congress has authority to legislate uniform voting resi-
dency standards or uniform absentee voting laws, the supremacy
clause' 170 requires that conflicting state laws must fall.17'
D. Undertake a Joint Federal-State Study on Absentee Voting Law
Whether or not Congress has authority to legislate in these areas, a
comprehensive, joint federal-state study of the problems of absentee
voting laws, state voting residency laws and viable solutions is strongly
recommended. 172
169. The twenty-sixth amendment authorizes Congress to pass legislation to pre-
vent abridgment, as well as denial, of the right of persons 18 years of age or older to
vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §§ 1, 2. To "abridge" means to "diminish, curtail,
deprive, cut off, reduce." Jolicoeur, 5 Cal.3d at 571, 488 P.2d at 4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
700; cf. Worden, 61 N.J. at 333-34, 294 A.2d at 237 (twenty-sixth amendment's
legislative history evidences a purpose of encouraging younger persons to vote "by the
elimination of all unnecessary burdens and barriers") (citing S. REP. No. 26, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971), discussed in note 126 supra). However, opponents of
federal legislation would argue that (1) no one is forced to attend college, thus
preventing him from voting in person, and (2) absentee voting is a privilege provided
by the states, not a right. See note 144 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of absentee voting's status as a privilege.
Whether Congress may legislate to better accommodate college students desiring to
vote by absentee ballot is as much a policy question as it is a constitutional question.
Our nation's increasing mobility rate, see note 66 supra and accompanying text, and
increasing percentage of absentee voters, see note 174 infra and accompanying text,
make absentee voting a larger concern than it was when people did not move
frequently. If states do not make the absentee franchise more efficient and complete,
perhaps the federal government owes a duty to absentee voters to do so.
170. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding").
171. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 249; England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 311-12 (1963); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406-07 (1872); cf. Wal-
gren v. Howes, 482 F.2d at 95, 102-03 (1st Cir. 1973) ("'[state] laws governing non-
Federal elections. . . will have to be changed to prevent conflict with the . . . intent
of [the twenty-sixth] amendment"') (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 7565 (1971) (remarks of
Congressman Randall)). This is true whether the conflict is legislative or judicial.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 249.
172. Consider the following suggested absentee voting scheme: For students who
desire to retain the right to vote as domiciliaries of their pre-college residences,
election officials in each district in which a college is located should be provided with
a list of the election officials, at least one for each state, to which applications for
registration can be sent. A preferable and more expedient alternative is the creation
of one type of registration form for the whole country, so that students can obtain the
form at college. However, getting a 50-state consensus as to the proper form may be
difficult.
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Our society's increased mobility 7 3 has made absentee voting much
more common. 174 If the right to vote is not to be compromised by the
societal changes that have resulted in the absence of significant num-
bers of students, and non-students, from their home districts on elec-
tion day, our election laws must be changed to better help these voters
cast their ballots.
VIII. Conclusion
While no presumption may be made constitutionally that students,
as a group, are not domiciled at college for voting purposes, it is
equally clear that states must require that voters be bona fide residents
of the area in which they vote. The only constitutional resolution that
can be drawn is that equal standards must be applied to all persons in
determining their qualification to vote. As inquiries beyond the rou-
tine questions asked by election officials may not be administratively
practical if made of each applicant, 75 those officials must be empow-
ered to objectively distinguish those applicants whose domiciliary
status is suspect and, by asking only relevant questions unrelated to
status as a student, determine who is in fact a resident for voting
purposes. For such a plan to work, election officials must be carefully
taught the domicile principles outlined herein and must apply them in
good faith. 17 Also, electors must be informed of the prerequisites to
To ensure that students who are interested in voting as domiciliaries of their pre-
college residences have the opportunity to cast an informed ballot, they should
receive, from their local election boards, campaign information from those candi-
dates for local, state and federal offices who desire that students have pertinent
information about them. The lack of information available to college students about
the candidates and issues in the election district of their pre-college residences may be
a significant contributing factor in their decisions not to vote by absentee ballot. See
discussion of Shivelhood, supra note 30, and discussion of Jolicoeur, supra note 141.
The boards of elections should be allowed to prescribe reasonable bulk limits on
the campaign information. The cost of the publications, as well as the postage,
should be borne by the candidates. Information about referenda should also be sent
to students.
173. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
174. The percentage of absentee voting has risen from approximately 1 or 2% in
the 1920's to approximately 5.5% (national average) in 1972 (over 4.1 million
voters). See ABSENTEE REGISTRATION LAWS, supra note 16, at 5. In most presidential
elections, 5.5% can be decisive. Id.
175. See United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. at 1250 (testimony of 70 voting
registrars that they "do not have the personnel ... to conduct detailed inquiries with
reference to each applicant").
176. Cf. Auerbach, 499 F. Supp. at 1343 (no additional proof may be required of
students "beyond that required of all other applicants unless [election registrars] have
reasonable grounds on which to base a belief that the individual applicant's claim of
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establishing a new domicile and of the corresponding consequences of
doing so.
Absentee voting procedures must be made more efficient and the
franchise made more complete. Federal absentee legislation for all
elections is preferable to state legislation. 177 However, since such fed-
eral legislation is of questionable constitutionality, 178 this Comment
recommends that the federal and state governments jointly study this
problem and propose a uniform absentee voting system179 to be
adopted voluntarily by each state. 180
Joseph A. Bolihojer
residency is untrue"); Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at 1305; Bright, 336 F. Supp. at 534
("[n]othing may be presumed or implied from the fact that a registration applicant is
a student").
177. A uniform absentee voting law enacted by the federal government would
eliminate the possibility that absentee voters might be disenfranchised due to con-
flicting states' laws.
178. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
179. The two studies cited in notes 16 & 133 supra provide a good framework
within which to study this problem.
180. Two caveats must be remembered and considered together for a proper
determination of this issue: (1) election officials must be required to exercise good
faith in applying common law domicile principles to determine who is eligible to vote
in each district; see note 175 supra and accompanying text; (2) college student status
should have no bearing upon whether a person is entitled to exercise a voice, through
the ballot, in the government of the community to which he or she has the greatest
attachment. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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